This paper examines the Swedish ball bearings industry during the Second World War, including subsidiary operations in Germany and the United Kingdom.
Introduction
Just over thirty years ago, Scandinavian Economic Historians were absorbed in a lively debate over the extent to which Sweden aided the German war effort. In the most famous of the articles during this period, Alan Milward demonstrated that denying Swedish iron ore to Germany could not have stopped the war; 2 eight years later, Martin Fritz's study of ball bearings concluded that Sweden did not provide sufficient aid to the German war effort to change the course of the war. 3 Although this debate ended formally in the late 1970s, many questions were left unanswered. The most puzzling is why so much diplomatic effort was put into policies of the international supply of ball bearings if they seemed so unimportant to post-war commentators. 4 A fresh examination of the ball bearings industry in the Second World War indicates that Swedish-controlled ball bearings were crucial to both the German and British war effort. Of the two, the Swedish parent company supplied more ball bearings and machine tools to the Germans, enough to significantly affect the outcome of the war. But the Swedish government's overall wartime activities were more even-handed than the headline trade statistics might suggest, for example, letting British planes and ships run the blockade from Sweden in 1942. But, although it nominally controlled much of the production of German and British ball bearings, denying either belligerent Swedish-supplied bearings or machines would merely have slowed the war effort, not ended it.
Ball and roller bearings are speciality engineering products which use balls to reduce rotational friction and support loads by separating moving axles. During a war, they are particularly useful in airplane motors, tanks, automobiles, guns, submarine engines and similar war materiel. During the Second World War, ball bearings and the machinery for producing them were among the most sought-after and disputed products. The Swedish company SKF controlled the requisite high-strength raw materials, machine tools, intellectual property and patents necessary to produce the highest quality finished product in Sweden and SKF's subsidiary factories in many European countries.
In the case of both Germany and the United Kingdom, there were two different levels of Swedish ball bearings supply: imports and Swedish-controlled local products. The parent company, Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF), produced and directly exported ball bearings to both the belligerents. SKF also part-owned local manufacturing facilities in both, producing ball bearings which were not limited by Swedish government export quotas and restrictions; although only part SKF-owned and therefore out of the parent company's direct control, these subsidiaries relied on SKF supplies of Swedish-built machinery and technical knowledge transfers. SKF Subsidiaries included the Vereinige Kugellagerfabriken AG (VKF) concentrated in Schweinfurt, Germany, SKF Industries in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, and the Skefko Ball Bearing Company, in Luton, England, as well as other subsidiaries throughout occupied Europe. 5 Together with its subsidiaries, SKF held a near monopoly position in the manufacture of high quality ball bearings in Europe. While each country had other domestic ball bearings producers, to paraphrase an American report, none was able to acquire the raw material and requisite intellectual knowledge to produce bearings as robust and durable as those of SKF. 6 The first and second parts of this article thematically review the relations between Sweden and Germany and between Sweden and the UK. The Swedish company ultimately controlled about 58% of German and 31% of British supplies. Sweden rarely honoured its agreements on ball bearings exports. Changes in quantities delivered and prices depended on the relative strength of the recipients.
The third part of this study concerns the main question: given their control over supplies, could SKF have stopped the Second World War? As this paper shows, had either country's supply chain been interrupted in the early phase of the war, the degree of mechanization and possibly the outcome of the war would for a while have been affected.
But ultimately the lack of direct Swedish imports could have been overcome by long-term industrial changes and import substitution programmes; the success of these programmes would depend on the quality of the bearings required and their final industrial application.
How Sweden could have withheld these exports and whether it would have been politically and economically feasible remain very much in question. 
Germany

German Imports from Sweden
The growth in 
German Domestic Production
About half the production of German ball bearings, mainly in Schweinfurt, was controlled by Vereinige Kullagerfabriken AG (VKF). 13 Although SKF had no operational control, the VKF factories were almost entirely Swedish in origin, apart from labour and energy inputs: they were developed with Swedish capital, employed Swedish designs/intellectual property and used Swedish machine tools. 14 As Table I Machines and supplies for normal operation and increased capacity were provided by SKF. VKF grew proportionately in the run-up to the war, with VKF's Schweinfurt plant capacity increasing by 50% in 1938. 15 In late 1943 it tried to expand again, to make up for decreasing exports from Sweden. 16 Table I shows that VKF increased its nominal production overall by 45% from 1939 to 1943, about 11% annually, largely thanks to SKF machines.
SKF's provision of machinery to VKF can be described as crucial for maintaining and increasing plant production in this period -48% of Germany's supplies of bearings were Swedish-related.
Allied Action to Limit German Ball Bearings
Allied pre-emptive attempts to end this Swedish-German trade were only partially successful, given the nature of the supply chain in question. By late 1943, the Allies were treating ball bearings as one of the "choke points" in Germany's war economy. 17 The Americans and British collaborated to limit both German domestic production and Swedish imports. 18 Germany produced less because of Allied bombings in August and October 1943, which damaged VKF's factories in Schweinfurt. 19 As Table I The existing view is also challenged by the preferential pricing for Germany compared with the rest of the German bloc. Table II shows that Germany also received consistent discounts for balls and rollers, compared to both the occupied territories and the neutrals, before and during the war. 36 The relative discount to the occupied territories increased in those years. Calculating a straight discount for the Germans, the average difference between Germany's price index and that for the neutrals is 29%.
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From these examples, it is clear that someone tried to ensure that Germany paid less for these much-needed items. If SKF was setting price levels, the discounts suggest the company wanted to ensure that Germany continued to purchase Swedish-made bearings, Agreement. Allied pre-emptive attempts to limit this trade came too late and were bypassed too easily to affect the outcome. Discounts were provided.
The United Kingdom
SKF also had an important effect on the British war effort, providing some 31% of British ball bearings production, including considerable quantities for aero engines. As with Germany, Sweden's part in the British ball bearings supply chain includes both domestic production and Swedish imports. Although the archives of the British ball bearing control directorate are missing, the UK was dependent on SKF for certain aspects of bearings production. Britain was particularly short of bearings under one inch and over four inches in diameter, all important for tanks, aeroplanes and large motors. On the basis of statistics from Operation Performance, the quantities of cargo can be determined by type. As seen in Table IV converted American Liberators. 62 The cargo operations were used to transport the highpriority Swedish ball bearings necessary for aircraft production in the UK.
Detailed statistics on the number of flights, cargo and value of this illicit airborne trade can be provided. The Commercial Department of the Swedish government maintained records of the flights and exports, though not reported as part of normal trade through the Skaggerak. 63 As Table III shows, Swedish reports suggest that, excluding passenger luggage and similar cargo, the total goods flown to the UK increased steadily for most of the war:
from 46 tons in 1942 to 448 metric tons in 1944. The air cargo consisted of very high value materials needed for the British and Allied war effort, including ball bearings, machinery and high-speed steel.
As seen in Table V , the airborne traffic resulted in a total of 725 metric tons of commercial freight. Table VI shows that of the 725 total tons shipped in the air smuggling operation, 399 tons is estimated to have been SKF ball bearings materials with an additional 43 tons of machines destined for Skefko. The remainder included American, British Diplomatic, Norwegian Diplomatic, Russian, Polish and other commercial cargo. 64 These official statistics probably omit some of the more covert export operations, including possible smuggling in the nearly one metric ton of British diplomatic cargo per week, and the expropriation by Britain of the bearings meant for the USSR. 65 Unfortunately, the lack of archives for the British ball bearings control organization means these possible additions cannot be easily assessed. 
Domestic Production
Exports of machinery and similar equipment from Sweden allowed Skefko to maintain domestic production during the war. Machines and equipment sold by SKF were used at the Skefko Ball Bearings works in Luton. Although Skefko was not owned by SKF at the start of the war, SKF and Skefko had a 30-year agreement for the supply of high-speed steel, interchange of finished products, pooling of patents, designs and technical information within the group controlled by the SKF Company. 68 This arrangement continued throughout the war. Skefko's machines were dependent on imported SKF parts and materials for continued production. There are clearly documented cases of Skefko waiting for machines and machine parts from Sweden. 69 British attempts at import substitution led to increased rejection rates and mechanical wear which ultimately damaged other parts. 70 As this suggests, the lack of SKF machines and machine parts would not have stopped production but would certainly have progressively slowed it as equipment aged. 1938 -1945 av Kommerskollegium, 1938 -1946 For the direct Swedish ball bearing exports to the UK, SKF price negotiations seem to have clearly depended on political forces. is not an error, but rather the effect of British commitments under the Allied pre-emptive purchasing programme. This dramatically increased the overall cost of ball bearings to the UK, whatever the volume.
It should be noted that SKF provided even more substantial discounts to Britain's ball bearings purchases than Germany's. 73 Table II shows that in 1938, SKF charged the British 74% of the price to Germany for the same material, and by 1943 this figure dropped to 68%.
Such discounts off list prices were commercial decisions agreed to as part of the trade negotiations. 74 Their rationale remains unclear but it may be argued that it derived from the convertibility of the Pound versus other currencies received. However, SKF set the prices and retained only Kronor earnings so under-pricing gave them no advantage. 75 The discounts could have been an attempt, notable at the time, by SKF to maintain favour and to quash Allied blacklisting and other threats against itself and its British and American subsidiaries. 76 Unfortunately, when the SKF archives perished, they probably put the precise reasons for these discounts beyond discovery. aircraft. 77 These shortages could obviously have jeopardised fighting capability in the shortterm. Britain clearly decided that it was more efficient to bring these bearings to the UK by air than to risk an import substitution programme.
One of the reasons for this choice was the quality of domestically produced bearings.
A post-war British government report on the bearings industry maintains that ball bearings were difficult to replicate, citing a 1940 to 1941 attempt to rapidly expand the industry to supply the shortfall created by the blockade of Sweden. The same as presumably applies equally to the Germans. 78 Ball bearings have to be exactly sized and perfectly round, without any defects to ensure long-term use in high stress applications such as engines. The metallurgy, machinery and machine processes are difficult to reverse engineer; it is virtually impossible to produce an identical ball bearing which will wear in the same way. Skilled labour was particularly scarce and training unskilled labour risked higher levels of rejected bearings entering the supply chain. 79 Because of the pressure and heat surrounding them, even the slightest defect renders the bearing useless. SKF subsidiaries, already harassed because of their neutral affiliation, could have been expropriated by the belligerents. This helps to explain the behaviour of SKF and its government. The policies discussed above were specifically designed to maintain exports to both belligerents. Because they were so difficult to replace, the belligerents' need for access 
